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MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY HOUSING: ARE 
PERMANENCY AND AFFORDABILITY POSSIBLE? 
Mackenzie Lew† 
INTRODUCTION  
Affordable rental housing policy has shifted drastically since its in-
ception in the early twentieth century.1 Generally, governments on all lev-
els have backed away from aggressive affordable housing policies. For 
example, public housing, run by local governments, funded through a mix 
of federal, state, and local monies, and established to house the poor and 
low-income families,2 is now a scarce commodity. A near elimination of 
funding has resulted in not only the absence of development of new public 
housing but has also left localities struggling to maintain living conditions 
in a now aging population of public housing projects.3 
Governments, however, have not been the sole providers of afforda-
ble housing. At one point, rents for privately owned apartments across 
New York City were regulated regardless of a building’s location or a 
tenant’s income-level.4 Rent regulations applied to any and all buildings 
 
 †  Mackenzie Lew received her J.D. from CUNY School of Law in 2018. She is currently 
a law graduate at the Urban Justice Center’s Mental Health Project working on disability ben-
efits appeals. The author would like to thank Professors Andrea McArdle and Stephen 
Loffredo for their input, the CUNY Law Review for their insightful edits and suggestions, and 
Barika Williams and Harvey Epstein for fielding questions. 
 1 See Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing – An Intimate History, in THE LEGAL GUIDE 
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 3 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2nd ed. 2011), for a brief 
overview of the history of, inter alia, public housing, non-profit and private sector programs, 
and tax-incentives for housing in the United States. 
 2 See id. at 4-5. 
 3 See id. at 6-7. 
 4 In 1942, the federal government enacted nationwide rent restrictions. See TIMOTHY L. 
COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BOARD AND THE RENT 
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with a certain number of units and built before a certain year.5 Toward the 
end of the twentieth century, however, governments began to incentivize 
the provision of affordable housing.6 Perhaps a greater shift toward pro-
moting public-private relationships and private industry explains why af-
fordable housing became less of a government responsibility or manda-
tory requirement for residential property owners, and instead became a 
type of housing developers could elect to provide. 
In 2014, shortly after taking office, Mayor Bill de Blasio revealed 
his Housing New York plan.7 Under this plan, Mayor de Blasio sought to 
construct or preserve 200,000 affordable units over ten years.8 To pre-
serve affordable housing, Mayor de Blasio envisioned protecting rent reg-
ulated tenants from wrongful eviction by providing counsel in Housing 
Court,9 ensuring the long-term sustainability of city-operated public hous-
ing and “provid[ing] more standardized and efficient preservation pro-
grams.”10 Also, as part of his plan, Mayor de Blasio pledged to create a 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing program to “promote economic diver-
sity and affordable housing development.”11 In late 2017, Mayor de 
Blasio released a “new and improved” plan to build or preserve 300,000 
units by 2026, up from the previous goal of 200,000 by 2022.12 
This article highlights two forms of incentive-based affordable hous-
ing programs within New York City. Section I discusses the history of 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing and its development through amend-
ments to the City’s Zoning Resolution. This section also explores the de-
tails of the program’s affordability aspect and an overview of the govern-
ment agencies involved. Section II of this article describes the taxed-
 
STABILIZATION SYSTEM 25 (rev. ed. 2016). In response to this legislation, New York imple-
mented what is known as Rent Control throughout the city. Id. at 26. Decades later, the City 
enacted the Rent Stabilization Laws of 1969. Id. at 30. 
 5 See id. at 30. 
 6 See Edson, supra note 1, at 15-17. 
 7 CITY OF N.Y., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-
YEAR PLAN (2014), https://perma.cc/UYN8-5RGF [hereinafter HOUSING NEW YORK 2014]. 
 8 Id. at 5-6, 8. 
 9 After years of advocacy, the city passed legislation to ensure that tenants in certain 
housing court proceedings and who fell below certain income levels would be represented by 
counsel. Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation to Provide Low-Income New Yorkers with Access 
to Counsel for Wrongful Evictions, NYC (Aug. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/2STE-KCGH. 
 10 HOUSING NEW YORK 2014, supra note 7, at 53; see also CITY OF N.Y., ONE NEW YORK: 
THE PLAN FOR A STRONG AND JUST CITY 70 (2015), https://perma.cc/6BBX-WVWT. 
 11 HOUSING NEW YORK 2014, supra note 7, at 30. 
 12 CITY OF N.Y., HOUSING NEW YORK 2.0 (2017), https://perma.cc/BG7W-TJFT; Housing 
New York 2.0: Mayor de Blasio Releases New Road Map to Build and Preserve 300,000 Af-
fordable Homes, NYC (Nov. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZL99-EKMS; see also Tanay 
Warerkar, De Blasio Admin Ups Affordable Housing Goals to 300k Units by 2026, CURBED 
N.Y. (Oct. 24, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/VG2C-BXUH. 
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based program, “421-a,” and discusses the 2016 revelation that hundreds 
of buildings receiving the 421-a tax benefit failed to provide affordable 
housing in return. Lastly, Section III of this article emphasizes that with-
out affirmative oversight by the government, Mandatory Inclusionary 
Housing, like 421-a, will become an unreliable tool for providing afford-
able housing. 
I. HISTORY OF MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY HOUSING TO 2016 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH) is the City’s newest incen-
tive-based affordable housing program. Approved by the City Council in 
March 2016 with overwhelming support,13 the mayoral administration 
touted the program as one of the country’s “most progressive” affordable 
housing program.14 Not only is the inclusion of affordable housing in new 
development mandatory under the program, but the affordable housing 
would be permanent.15 In addition to a number of caveats to both of these 
progressivisms, the program has also encountered some political road 
blocks. For example, a number of City Councilmembers have rejected 
MIH developments in their districts, compelling the City Council to dis-
approve individual MIH applications.16 Still, the mayoral administration 
hopes that MIH will be the City’s ultimate and most successful engine for 
creating new affordable housing. Mayor de Blasio hopes that MIH will 
create 12,000 affordable apartments by 2026.17 The following is a histor-
ical description of the Zoning Resolution, its amendments, and the 
groundwork for MIH. 
 
 13 On March 22, 2016, the New York City Council approved the MIH program with a 
vote of forty-two to five. N.Y.C. Council Res. No. 1022, L.U. No. 334 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/J2HH-JJZ9. 
 14 Sally Goldenberg & Gloria Pazmino, Council Reaches Deal on de Blasio’s Housing 
Plans, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 2016, 9:36 PM), https://perma.cc/5SPW-NGAY. 
 15 Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, N.Y.C. PLANNING, https://perma.cc/55GK-TWKH. 
However, the affordability restrictions are not mandatory for buildings with ten or less units. 
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-154(d)(4)(i) (2018), https://perma.cc/YRP7-
ZTUZ. 
 16 See, e.g., Joe Anuta, City Council Snubs de Blasio, Nixes Inwood Affordable-Housing 
Rezoning, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Aug. 16, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://perma.cc/W83C-5C73 (re-
porting that the City Council rejected an MIH proposal from a for-profit developer after Coun-
cil Member Ydanis Rodriguez expressed disapproval). 
 17 Matt A.V. Chaban, Why, in One Case, the de Blasio Administration Opposes Afforda-
ble Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/TF8L-LYF6. 
4 CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM [Vol. 21:2 
A. The Inclusionary Housing Program 
In the second half of the twentieth century, as the City was stripped 
of its power to impose blanket rent regulations,18 a number of federal and 
state tools became available to developers that imposed affordability re-
quirements. Residential developers could offset the costs of construction 
by using the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit and the City and 
State’s 421-a and J-51 tax benefit programs, as well as a number of pub-
licly subsidized construction loans.19 The City, however, was left without 
a tool of its own until Inclusionary Housing came into existence. 
In the late 1980’s, the City harnessed what seemed like the only sys-
tem of laws which would allow for the creation of a truly city-controlled 
affordable housing program – the City’s Zoning Resolution.20 The Zoning 
Resolution was amended in 1987 to establish the Inclusionary Housing 
(IH) program,21 also referred to as the Voluntary Inclusionary Housing 
program, which is still in existence today, but is a precursor to MIH. The 
Inclusionary Housing program has two distinguishing features that set it 
apart from other well-known, incentive-based affordable housing pro-
grams. First, unlike the state’s 421-a and J-51 tax benefit programs, the 
City does not lose valuable tax revenue by administering IH.22 Second, 
and most important in terms of designating oversight over the program, 
IH is both city-created and city-administered. Lastly, IH may be one of 
the most legally complex affordable housing programs because of the 
 
 18 In 1983, the State Legislature passed the Omnibus Housing Act, which transferred the 
administration of rent regulations from the City to the State. Omnibus Housing Act, ch. 403, 
§ 28, 1983 N.Y. Laws; COLLINS, supra note 4, at 15-20, 36. Earlier, in 1971, the Legislature 
had adopted what is known as the “Urstadt law,” which prevented the City from enacting rent 
regulations more restrictive than those in place at the time. COLLINS, supra note 4, at 29. 
 19 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2018) (federal low-income housing credit); Treas. Reg. § 1.42-0 (2016) 
(Low Income Housing Tax Credit [LIHTC] program); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a 
(McKinney 2018) (421-a tax benefit program, recently renamed the Affordable New York 
Housing Program); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 11-243 to 11-244 (2018) (J-51 tax ex-
emption and abatement program). 
 20 See generally NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION (2018), https://perma.cc/YL7Y-
9B9T. 
 21 Howard Goldman, Inclusionary Housing in New York City’s Zoning Resolution, 11 
CITY L. 73, 73 (2005). 
 22 Developers who receive 421-a or J-51 tax benefits are either exempt from, or receive 
an abatement for, property taxes over a period of time. As a result, the City forgoes the ability 
to collect property taxes from these developers. However, developers who take advantage of 
the IH program are merely permitted to build at greater heights and densities than generally 
allowed under the Zoning Resolution. See id.; N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW§ 421-a (McKinney 
2017); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 489 (McKinney 2015) (authorizing New York City to 
implement a tax abatement program for rehabilitated buildings, as implemented in ADMIN. 
CODE § 11-243). 
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number of different government bodies and private players involved.23 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, a later iteration of IH, is no less com-
plex. 
1. New York City’s Zoning Resolution 
New York City’s Zoning Resolution is an expansive document that 
determines the nature of city blocks. Originally established in 1916, the 
Zoning Resolution was entirely replaced in 1961.24 Unlike the New York 
City Construction Codes which dictate the physical manner in which a 
developer must build,25 the Zoning Resolution mandates where and what 
a developer may build based on a system of zoning districts.26 Addition-
ally, the Zoning Resolution mandates the height and density of build-
ings.27 In this way, the Zoning Resolution dictates the City’s skyline and 
cityscape from street-level. 
New York City derives its power to enact its zoning ordinance from 
New York’s General City Law.28 The procedure for amending the Zoning 
Resolution is governed by the New York City Charter,29 which is the gov-
erning statute for the city. Generally, the City Planning Commission 
(CPC) recommends and approves amendments to the Zoning Resolution, 
and the City Council reviews the amendments and gives final approval.30 
The CPC also has jurisdiction to approve special permits; however the 
City Council maintains final decision-making authority over special per-
mits.31 
The Department of Buildings (DOB) enforces and implements the 
Zoning Resolution in addition to the city’s Construction Codes.32 The 
 
 23 See discussion infra Sections I.A.1, I.B.2. 
 24 Stuart Beckerman, Zoning in New York City: An Overview, N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. 
REP., January/February 2006 at 1 (2006). 
 25 See generally NEW YORK, N.Y., GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS (2014); NEW 
YORK, N.Y., PLUMBING CODE (2014); NEW YORK, N.Y., MECHANICAL CODE (2014); NEW 
YORK, N.Y., FUEL GAS CODE (2014); NEW YORK, N.Y., BUILDING CODE (2014). 
 26 See Beckerman, supra note 24. For example, the area surrounding Citi Field in Flush-
ing, Queens has for decades been characteristically occupied by auto repair shops. This is 
because the district near Citi Field was for decades zoned for industrial purposes. In 2008, the 
City rezoned the area and created the “Willets Point Special District” to create a “lively, mixed 
use, sustainable community and a regional retail and entertainment destination.” Special Pur-
pose Districts: Queens, N.Y.C. PLANNING, https://perma.cc/HF9L-F243; see also NEW YORK, 
N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 124-00 (2016). 
 27 See Beckerman, supra note 24. 
 28 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24)–(25) (McKinney 2018). 
 29 See NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER OF 1989 ch. 8, § 200. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See New York, N.Y., CHARTER OF 1989 ch. 8, § 201(b). 
 32 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 71-00 (2016). 
6 CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM [Vol. 21:2 
DOB is also responsible for issuing construction permits and certificates 
of occupancy, which officially permit buildings to be occupied.33 
While the DOB and CPC deal primarily with development, another 
city agency’s delegated mission is to construct and preserve affordable 
housing. This agency, the Department of N.Y.C. and Development 
(HPD),34 plays an important role in the IH/MIH programs because neither 
DOB nor the CPC, but rather HPD, administers the IH/MIH programs.35 
2. A Zoning Amendment to Promote the Development of 
Affordable Housing 
In 1987, the Zoning Resolution was amended to include IH as a “bo-
nus.”36 IH was not the first “incentive zoning,” meaning the granting of 
discretionary bonuses to increase the allowable density for a develop-
ment. The 1961 Zoning Resolution favored “green oases” – public plazas 
and open spaces in exchange for increased density.37 Many of these 
“green oases” exist today and are most noticeably present in Midtown 
Manhattan. In contrast to “green oases,” IH substitutes green spaces with 
residential units by permitting density increases in exchange for the pro-
vision of “low income” housing.38 
Under the most recent form of IH, a developer may elect to use the 
bonus, hence the oft-used name, “Voluntary Inclusionary Housing.”39 Ad-
ditionally, the IH bonus is only available in certain high density residen-
tial districts, primarily located in Manhattan, IH Designated Areas, and 
Special Districts.40 IH was amended in 2005;41 however the current pro-
gram is generally as it was in 1987. After 2005, “incentive zoning” was 
not significantly overhauled until the induction of MIH in 2016. 
 
 33 See NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN CODE § 28-103.11 (2018). 
 34 About HPD, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., https://perma.cc/4NL8-HJXZ. 
 35 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-92. 
 36 See Goldman, supra note 21, at 73. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id.; see also Voluntary Inclusionary Housing, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & 
DEV., https://perma.cc/W7XB-GQY2. 
 40 See ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 23-932 to 23-933; Goldman, supra note 21, at 73. 
 41 See Goldman, supra note 21, at 73 (explaining that changes to the IH program were 
made applicable to certain rezoned communities, such as Hudson Yards and Greenpoint-Wil-
liamsburg). 
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B. Mandatory Inclusionary Housing: Developing Affordable Housing 
After 2016 
Mayor de Blasio proposed MIH as part of his ambitious Housing 
New York plan.42 Unable to propose new blanket rent regulations or 
amend tax incentive programs, the Mayor turned to the Zoning Resolu-
tion. In addition to being within the city’s control, the Zoning Resolution 
was already home to an incentive based affordable housing program, In-
clusionary Housing.43 MIH is merely a variation of an earlier affordable 
housing scheme, Inclusionary Housing. 
MIH’s two key components are that developers are mandated to pro-
vide affordable units,44 and the units are permanently rent restricted.45 
However, MIH only applies to districts that have been rezoned on CPC 
or City Council initiative, or to buildings that have been rezoned as a re-
sult of private application.46 As of March 2018, over two years after MIH 
was adopted, roughly fifty discreet districts have been rezoned as MIH 
Designated Areas,47 and a number of private applications for rezoning 
have been withdrawn or denied by City Councilmembers.48 
1. AMI-Based Rent Restrictions 
Under MIH, rents are restricted according to a combination of four 
affordability levels (two “base” options, in addition to two supplemental 
 
 42 HOUSING NEW YORK 2014, supra note 7, at 30-31. 
 43 See discussion infra Section I.A.1-2. 
 44 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-933. Moreover, many tenants and advocacy organiza-
tions have rightfully pointed out that while the units developed under most programs are la-
belled as “affordable,” they are not in fact affordable to most low-income New Yorkers. See, 
e.g., Jonathan Sizemore, One Year Under Mandatory Rules Produces 4,700 Affordable Units, 
CITYLAND (Mar. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/PCT8-9CKJ (reporting that community board 
and borough president in Sunnyside, Queens expressed concern that the income-restricted 
units would not be affordable to current Sunnyside residents). 
 45 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-96. 
 46 See Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, N.Y.C. PLANNING, https://perma.cc/55GK-
TWKH. 
 47 See ZONING RESOLUTION app. F (2018), https://perma.cc/K3TC-HQSZ (indicating the 
maps of Mandatory Inclusionary Housing areas). 
 48 Sizemore, supra note 44 (reporting that a non-profit developer rescinded its proposal 
for an MIH development in Sunnyside, Queens, after the community board and borough pres-
ident expressed concern that the income-restricted units would not be affordable to current 
Sunnyside residents); see, e.g., Anuta, supra note 16. As of April 25, 2017 the City Council’s 
Zoning Subcommittee approved two private applications for MIH developments – one in Flat-
bush-Ditmas Park (Caton Market) and another in Bedford Stuyvesant (Rose Castle). The pro-
jects were approved despite vocal disapproval. Three Affordable Housing Projects Approved 
by Land Use Committee with Measured Disapproval, CITYLAND (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/YL6D-9AQM. 
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options, discussed below).49 Additionally, a developer may receive an 
MIH bonus and contribute to an Affordable Housing Fund in lieu of 
providing affordable units.50 Each affordability level is defined by a cer-
tain percentage of the Area Median Income (AMI).51 The AMI for New 
York City is calculated by the Department of Housing & Urban Develop-
ment (HUD), the federal housing and urban development agency.52 
To promote financial feasibility and flexibility, the City Council and 
the CPC can impose one of two varying affordability options in an MIH 
development: 
1. “Base” Option 1: 25% of the floor area is set aside for units 
affordable for households earning an average of 60% of the AMI. 
As a result, rents may be set for varying income bands (i.e., low 
income, moderate income, middle income), but there may be no 
more than three income bands. Lastly, at least 10% of the floor 
area must be provided at 40% of the income index, and no income 
band may exceed 130%.53 
2. “Base” Option 2: 30% of the floor area is set aside for units 
affordable for households earning an average of 80% of the AMI. 
The building may not have more than three income bands, and no 
income band may exceed 130% of the income index.54 
In addition to Option 1 and Option 2, the CPC and City Council can 
impose one or both of the following supplemental affordability require-
ments: 
1. Deep Affordability Option: 20% of the floor area is set aside 
for households earning 40% of the AMI. With this option, the de-
veloper is not permitted to receive public funding or subsidies; 
unless HPD determines that public funding is necessary to support 
a significant amount of affordable housing in addition to the hous-
ing required by this option.55 
 
 49 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-154(d). 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 Affordability levels are based on what the Zoning Resolution refers to as the “income 
index” which is 200 percent of the Very Low-Income Limit established by HUD for Multi-
family Tax Subsidy Projects, as adjusted for household size. See ZONING RESOLUTION§ 23-
911. Additionally, because the AMI used within New York City includes surrounding counties 
with relatively higher income levels, the AMI does not accurately represent the AMI within 
the five boroughs. See Jarret Murphy, The Secret History of AMI, CITYLIMITS (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/5JEN-79XU. 
 53 ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-154(d)(3)(i). 
 54 ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-154(d)(3)(ii). 
 55 ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-154(d)(3)(iii). 
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2. Workforce Option: 30% of the floor area is set aside for 
households earning 115% of the AMI. This option cannot be used 
in conjunction with public funding or subsidies.56 
2. Application Process & Other Program Requirements 
While MIH is administered by HPD, a number of other city and state 
agencies, including the DOB and the New York State Division of Housing 
and Community Renewal (DHCR), become involved at various points 
during the application process. A developer wishing to build a residential 
building within an MIH Designated Area must submit an application to 
HPD.57 HPD approves an application once it is shown how the developer 
will provide affordable units and that the project is financially feasible.58 
Once approved, HPD will issue a Permit Notice, which allows the DOB 
to issue a construction permit.59 
MIH imposes a number of features that promote compliance. At the 
time of approval, HPD and the developer enter into a Regulatory Agree-
ment.60 The Regulatory Agreement sets forth the affordability require-
ments of the building and mandates the owner’s compliance with the MIH 
program and the terms of the Regulatory Agreement.61 Additionally, the 
Regulatory Agreement is recorded against the building lot, and so acts as 
a restrictive covenant that survives subsequent sales.62 
MIH also requires that the developer choose an HPD-approved non-
profit organization to manage the leasing of units within the building.63 
The non-profit does not manage the building in terms of repairs, but is 
responsible for calculating monthly rents at initial leasing, lease renewal, 
and subsequent rentals after a vacancy.64 Lastly, the non-profit is respon-
sible maintaining all records concerning compliance with MIH, and for 
submitting an affidavit to HPD annually.65 The affidavit must affirm that 
the rent levels in affordable units comply with MIH and that at initial oc-
cupancy the tenants of the units earned the appropriate income levels.66 
As an additional measure, MIH requires that the non-profit manager 
 
 56 ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-154(d)(3)(iv). 
 57 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(d)(1)-(2). 
 58 See id. 
 59 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-953(a). 
 60 See id. 
 61 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-96(f); ZONING RESOLUTION, 23-154(d). 
 62 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-96(f). 
 63 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-96(e). 
 64 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-911. 
 65 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-96(e)(4); ZONING RESOLUTION, 23-961(b)(4). 
 66 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(4). 
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maintain records concerning each affordable unit and the records must be 
made available to HPD if requested.67 
After the development is constructed, HPD will issue a Completion 
Notice to DOB.68 Once HPD issues a Completion Notice, DOB can issue 
a Certificate of Occupancy.69 At this point, the units can be occupied, 
however leasing generally begins at some point during the construction 
period. 
Under the MIH program, all rent restricted units are subject to rent 
stabilization.70 However, pursuant to MIH requirements, no rent restricted 
unit may be deregulated for any reason including high-rent or high-in-
come deregulation.71 In order to effectuate this component, developers 
must register each rent restricted unit with the DHCR.72 The DHCR over-
sees rent stabilization throughout the state,73 however the majority of rent 
stabilized apartments are located within New York City. 
3. Calculating Monthly Rent at Initial Rental and Subsequent 
Rentals After Vacancy 
Generally, owners of rent stabilized units may only increase monthly 
rents according to percentages set by the Rent Guidelines Board (RGB).74 
Although MIH rent restricted units are subject to rent stabilization, the 
RGB’s permitted increases are not dispositive of how monthly rents are 
calculated for these units. 
At the very first occupancy of a unit, the initial monthly rent should 
be calculated according to the affordability option imposed by MIH.75 
This monthly rent is also registered with DHCR.76 At lease renewal, the 
 
 67 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-96(e)(4). 
 68 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-953(b). 
 69 See id. 
 70 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(1). Rent Stabilization is a form of rent regulation 
that applies to buildings with six or more units built before 1974 and also to units built or 
rehabilitated with various tax benefit programs, including 421-a and J-51. See N.Y. 
UNCONSOL. LAWS § 26-504 (McKinney 2018). Rent stabilization imposes various tenant pro-
tections, including regulated rental increases and limited grounds for eviction (in addition to 
greater notice predicates in the context of eviction proceedings). See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2524.1-.4, 2522.1-.10 (2018). 
 71 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(5). 
 72 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(1). 
 73 UNCONSOL. § 26-510. 
 74 UNCONSOL. § 26-510(b). 
 75 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(2) (stating that the Regulatory Agreement must 
provide that the monthly rent charged at initial occupancy and at each subsequent lease re-
newal cannot be greater than the lessor of the maximum monthly rent [based on income band] 
or the legal regulated rent [registered at initial leasing]). 
 76 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(1). 
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monthly rent must be the lesser of (1) the monthly rent calculated accord-
ing to the affordability option imposed by MIH (as adjusted for any 
change in AMI) or (2) the legal rent registered with DHCR.77 In a plain-
read of the Zoning Resolution, it is unclear whether the owner is further 
permitted to increase the rent according to the RGB’s rent adjustments 
and so charge the lesser of (1) the income-restricted rent or (2) the legal 
regulated rent after imposing a renewal increase. 
The same uncertainty applies to leases after a vacancy. According to 
the Zoning Resolution, the monthly rent at initial occupancy after a va-
cancy must be the lesser of (1) the monthly rent calculated according to 
the affordability option imposed by MIH (as adjusted for any change in 
AMI) or (2) the legal rent registered with DHCR.78 However, again, it is 
unclear whether the owner is permitted to take advantage of the “vacancy 
bonus” allowed by the Rent Stabilization Laws.79 If an owner is so per-
mitted, the administering agent would have to calculate (1) the monthly 
rent calculated according to the affordability option imposed by MIH (as 
adjusted for any change in AMI) and (2) the rent after imposing the va-
cancy bonus increase. The monthly rent charged would be the lesser of 
the two. However, if the owner is not permitted to increase the rent by 
applying a vacancy bonus, then the monthly rent charged at initial occu-
pancy after a vacancy should be the amount permitted according to the 
affordability option imposed by MIH. 
In MIH developments, not only is the rent restricted, but at each ini-
tial occupancy, the tenant’s income cannot exceed the relevant income 
level imposed by MIH.80 Further, if an MIH development is subject to 
multiple affordability levels (i.e., the MIH development is subject to Op-
tion 1 and/or Option 2), the administering agent will be required to calcu-
late rents at lease renewal and at subsequent occupancies according to 
multiple AMI levels. 
II. THE 421-A PROGRAM: A TAX BENEFIT TO PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT 
AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing is one of many incentive-based 
programs within New York City. Another, called the “421-a program” 
after the Real Property and Tax Law of the same name, incentivizes the 
development of affordable housing in exchange for tax abatements.81 
 
 77 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(2). 
 78 See id. 
 79 Currently, the allowable vacancy increase is 20 percent. UNCONSOL. § 2522.8. 
 80 See ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(a)(1). 
 81 See generally N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2018). 
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The State Legislature originally created 421-a in 1971 to promote 
development. At the time, mass numbers of New Yorkers were fleeing 
the city as it experienced a financial crisis.82 The goal was to kick-start 
development in the hopes that economic vitality would follow.83 To do 
this, the state offered tax abatements which would ultimately offset the 
cost of development, even though the city lost potential tax revenue.84 
Developers throughout the city were entitled to 421-a tax benefits “as-of-
right,”85 meaning as long as the developer maintained the right to build a 
residential property, he maintained a right to receive 421-a benefits. Un-
der the program in its original form, developers were required to rent 
apartments at 85% of the market rate and subject the units to rent stabili-
zation – but for only so long as the tax abatements were in place.86 
In 1985, the State amended the program to reflect the view that the 
421-a program could be used as an engine to create affordable housing.87 
Most importantly, buildings wishing to receive the tax abatement within 
the newly formed Geographic Exclusion Area,88 an area encompassing 
most of Manhattan below Harlem, would be subject to somewhat restric-
tive affordability requirements.89 
Regardless of whether a building was within the Geographic Exclu-
sion Area, the tax abatement was applied almost uniformly: a developer 
who purchased a lot worth $1 million before development and $10 million 
afterward, would, by receiving the 421-a tax abatement, pay property 
taxes as if the property was valued at $1 million instead of $10 million.90 
The tax abatement would last for a set number of years, and then would 
slowly phase out.91 The 421-a program has been wildly successful for de-
velopers. In 2015, for example, developers received tax abatements for at 
least 88,000 rental units.92 During the same year, the program produced 
5,468 rent stabilized units.93 
 
 82 Seth B. Cohen, Note, Teaching an Old Policy New Tricks: The 421-A Tax Program 
and the Flaws of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J. L. & POL’Y 757, 764-65 (2008). 
 83 See id. at 766. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. at 771. 
 86 See id. at 765. 
 87 See id. at 767-68, 70. 
 88 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 89 Cohen, supra note 82, at 770-74. 
 90 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(b)(i) (McKinney 2017) (providing that the 
property is taxed at the value during the tax year before construction begins). 
 91 Cohen, supra note 82, at 766-67. See generally REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a. 
 92 N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2016 HOUSING SUPPLY REPORT 8 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/82D9-47T5. 
 93 Id. This reflects the number of units which received certificates of occupancy under 
421-a; this number does not reflect the number of units which were registered with DHCR and 
which were actually charged rents permitted according to the Rent Stabilization Laws. 
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A. Geographic Exclusion Area 
When criticism of 421-a began to rise in the early 1980’s, opponents 
of the program argued that 421-a spurred gentrification within Manhattan 
by promoting luxury development.94 Elected officials responded by cre-
ating the Geographic Exclusion Area (GEA), an area that included Man-
hattan below 96th Street and above Houston Street.95 Developments 
within the Geographic Exclusion Area would be required to provide 20% 
of the floor area at rental amounts affordable to tenants earning a certain 
percentage of the AMI.96 This AMI component reflected the most signif-
icant effort to impose affordability in new developments, since the units 
would not only be subject to rent stabilization, but to income-restrictions 
as well. 
Although the 421-a program is a product of the State Legislature,97 
New York City’s Housing Preservation and Development is directed to 
administer the program.98 As a result, the City is responsible for adminis-
tering 421-a through both HPD and the Department of Finance, the city’s 
agency responsible for calculating the tax abatements and collecting prop-
erty taxes. Despite this, the State still maintains ultimate control over the 
program’s core components while directing HPD to implement proce-
dures to ensure that developers are complying with the program’s require-
ments.99 
1. Registration Component 
The first overlap between 421-a and MIH is the role played by rent 
stabilization. Units created under both 421-a and MIH are subject to rent 
stabilization.100 With rent stabilization comes a number of important and 
coveted protections afforded to the units’ tenants. For example, rent sta-
bilized tenants are entitled to lease renewals and can only be evicted on 
limited grounds.101 The State Legislature sought to ensure that all 421-a 
 
 94 Cohen, supra note 82, at 767; Kim Velsey, A Taxing Matter: Looking Back on the 
History of 421-a, OBSERVER (May 28, 2015, 11:14 AM), https://perma.cc/W7KY-QGRT. 
 95 Cohen, supra note 82, at 771. Under the most recent version of 421-a, the GEA has 
expanded to include all of Manhattan and select areas in the other four boroughs. See REAL 
PROP. TAX §§ 421-a(7)(ii), (11); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 11-245 (2018). 
 96 Cohen, supra note 82, at 772. 
 97 Id. at 764; see also REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a. 
 98 See REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a(3)(a). 
 99 See REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a(10)(a)(ii). 
 100 NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-961(b)(1) (2016); see REAL PROP. TAX 
§ 421-a(2)(f). 
 101 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2524.3, 2524.4 (2018). In contrast to non-
regulated units, rent stabilized tenants may not have their leases terminated at-will. In fact, a 
rent stabilized tenant is habitually entitled to a lease renewal. Id. at § 2524.1. 
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units would receive the benefits of rent stabilization by requiring devel-
opers to register units with the DHCR at some point after initial leasing 
and continue to do so on an annual basis.102 
Determining whether an owner has failed to register apartments with 
DHCR is a somewhat simple task. First, the Department of Finance lists 
online detailed information regarding a building’s tax benefits, including 
not only whether the building receives 421-a, but the time span of the 
abatement and how many years remain.103 This information is public and 
can be accessed by any interested party.104 A building, by nature of re-
ceiving 421-a, should be registered with DHCR. At this point, a tenant 
may inquire with the Office of Rent Administration,105 a sub-agency of 
DHCR, whether their apartment is registered as rent stabilized. 
However, rent stabilization is not merely a statutory scheme that pro-
vides tenant protections. From its inception, the primary purpose of rent 
stabilization was to regulate annual rent increases available to owners of 
rent stabilized units.106 Rent regulation was, and is, a mechanism to stem 
rapidly inflating rental markets. 
2. Affordability Component 
By enjoining 421-a with rent stabilization, the State Legislature ef-
fectively connected two affordability programs. How the programs work 
in conjunction can be simple: owners of 421-a units outside of the GEA 
– units not subject to AMI restrictions – may only increase rents by (1) a 
percentage set by the RGB at lease renewal, and (2) the vacancy bonus 
percentage set by the rent stabilization laws at subsequent occupancies 
after a vacancy.107 However, the story is not so simple when it comes to 
AMI restricted units within the GEA. 
As discussed, a building within the GEA may only receive 421-a tax 
benefits if the building provides at least 20% of its units at rents that are 
affordable to a certain percentage of individuals or families with incomes 
 
 102 See REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a(10)(a)(i). 
 103 See About, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF FIN., https://perma.cc/HVJ4-9DCC; Property Portal, 
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF FIN., https://perma.cc/7FY2-K7BC. 
 104 To search properties by building block and lot number, see Property Portal, N.Y.C. 
DEP’T OF FIN., https://perma.cc/7FY2-K7BC. 
 105 See Tenant Protection Rent Regulated Units, N.Y.S HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, 
https://perma.cc/HR4A-D5J5. 
 106 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., THE ABC’S OF HOUSING 1 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/2RZC-9G2G. 
 107 See REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a (17)(i); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 26-510(b), 2522.8 
(McKinney 2018). 
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that do not exceed the AMI, at both the initial occupancy and at subse-
quent occupancies after vacancy.108 All the units in such a building, AMI 
restricted or not, are also subject to rent stabilization.109 This is the second 
overlap between 421-a and MIH: initial rents and subsequent rents are 
calculated in an almost identical manner. 
For example, the initial rent at first occupancy of a 421-a unit built 
in 2016 within the GEA – restricted to an affordability level of 60% of 
the AMI – should be rented at $933 a month to a household of four. This 
number reflects 30% of 60% of the AMI for a household of four, divided 
by twelve (reflecting the months of a year). At each lease renewal, the 
owner can increase the rent by whatever percentage the RGB allows. Af-
ter a vacancy, an owner of an AMI restricted unit is allowed a vacancy 
bonus, or a percentage increase set by the rent stabilization laws, currently 
set at 20%.110 However, the unit must be affordable to households earning 
60% of AMI at each subsequent occupancy, as well.111 In effect, the 
monthly rent at a subsequent occupancy is the lesser of: the legal regu-
lated rent after a vacancy bonus or the monthly rent affordable to a house-
hold earning 60% of the AMI. Calculating the monthly rent at subsequent 
occupancy is likely where owners are non-compliant. 
For tenants of 421-a buildings within the GEA, there exists no known 
tools, other than filing a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request, to 
determine whether the unit is AMI restricted. Upon registering an apart-
ment with the DHCR, an owner is obligated to indicate that the unit is a 
“421-a unit,”112 a designation that is documented in DHCR’s registration 
system. However, because the system is self-reporting and neither HPD 
nor DHCR confirm that 421-a units are, in fact, designated as such, there 
is no guarantee that this component is followed. Even if an apartment is 
designated as 421-a within DHCR’s system, the designation does little to 
inform the agency whether the unit is within the GEA or whether the unit 
is AMI restricted. As a result, the agency has little ability to determine 
whether the monthly rent charged to the tenant is correct under the 421-a 
program.113 
 
 108 See REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a (7)(c)(i). 
 109 See REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a (2)(f). 
 110 See UNCONSOL. § 2522.8. 
 111 See REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a (7)(c)(i). 
 112 See REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (10)(a)(i). 
 113 Generally, tenants may file complaints with the Office of Rent Administration (ORA), 
a sub-agency within DHCR. Rent Stabilization/Control Forms, N.Y.S. HOMES & CMTY. 
RENEWAL, https://perma.cc/2QUN-SWMY. Complaints can be filed for: rent overcharges 
(when the landlord is charging a monthly rent greater than legally permitted); failure to offer 
lease renewals (when the landlord fails to offer the tenant the option to renew the lease); har-
assment, and rent reductions based on decrease in services (when the landlord fails to make 
basic repairs or eliminates essential services and is therefore required to reduce the monthly 
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B. Controversy Sparked: Hundreds of Buildings Improperly Receiving 
Benefits 
Throughout 2015 and 2016, ProPublica published a series of articles 
that revealed a debilitating flaw in the 421-a program.114 Around 3,000 
buildings receiving the tax abatement had failed to register units as rent 
stabilized with DHCR.115 The failure to register meant two things: first, it 
was almost certain that units meant to be affordable were not subject to 
rent stabilization and were instead being rented at market rates; second, 
either the City, the State, or both government entities, were improperly 
administering the program. 
What was readily apparent was also a lack of communication be-
tween HPD and DHCR. The City, which administers the program through 
HPD and the Department of Finance, has records of all the developments 
which applied for and were approved to receive the 421-a tax abatement. 
However, the State statutes and City regulations left it up to developers to 
register affordable units with DHCR without a system of checking if the 
developer had, in fact, done so. DHCR, however, only becomes aware of 
rent stabilized units once owners register with the agency. Since there is 
no communication between HPD, the Department of Finance, and DHCR, 
HPD or DHCR would have to sua sponte research whether a building was 
receiving 421-a benefits, and then confirm that the units were registered 
 
rent), among others. Id. The ORA investigates the complaint, notifies the landlord who has an 
opportunity to respond, and then grants or denies the tenant’s complaint. See UNCONSOL. 
§ 2526.2(a). This process can take months to complete. Additionally, the Tenant Protection 
Unit (TPU) is a sub-agency within the DHCR that affirmatively enforces the RSL/RSC. TPU 
Timeline, N.Y.S. HOMES & COMMUNITY RENEWAL, https://perma.cc/TAS2-RFQZ. Under its 
enabling statute, the TPU is empowered to investigate landlords who may be violating the 
RSL/RSC, to issue subpoenas, and to bring lawsuits to remedy widespread violations. See 
UNCONSOL. § 2520.5(o). Along with the New York State Office of the Attorney General 
(OAG), HPD, and the DOB, the TPU is a member of the Tenant Harassment Prevention Task 
Force (THPTF). See Tenant Harassment Prevention Task Force, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
PRES. & DEV., https://perma.cc/5MZX-VJZT. The THPTF focuses on investigating landlords 
who use various forms of harassment to compel rent stabilized tenants to vacate apartments. 
See id. The task force enables the TPU to join forces with the OAG who can bring criminal 
charges against landlords for fraud or harassment. See id. 
 114 Cezary Podkul, Thousands of N.Y.C. Landlords Who Ignored Rent Caps Got Tax 
Breaks They Didn’t Qualify For, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:16 PM), 
https://perma.cc/XDU4-GTL4 [hereinafter Podkul, Thousands of N.Y.C. Landlords]; Cezary 
Podkul & Marcelo Rochabrun, Landlords Fail to List 50,000 N.Y.C. Apartments for Rent Lim-
its, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2015, 3:14 PM), https://perma.cc/C9DR-JMRG; Cezary Podkul & 
Marcelo Rochabrun, N.Y.C. Landlords Flout Rent Limits – But Still Rake in Lucrative Tax 
Breaks, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://perma.cc/YEK3-FGZQ; Marcelo Ro-
chabrun & Cezary Podkul, Tenants Take the Hit as New York Fails to Police Huge Housing 
Tax Break, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 4, 2015, 11:51 AM), https://perma.cc/6C2H-TQPF. 
 115 See Podkul, Thousands of N.Y.C. Landlords, supra note 114. 
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– a step that both HPD and DHCR either do not have the capacity to do, 
or choose not to do. Because no agency affirmatively confirms that 421-
a units are registered with the DHCR, it is likely that owners can fail to 
register without provoking interest from either HPD or DHCR. Further-
more, an owner who fails to register with the DHCR may also fail to pro-
vide units at the rent restricted levels to which they are statutorily man-
dated. 
Due to the lack of oversight, it is possible that any of the 88,000 units 
receiving the tax abatement are not offered at affordable monthly rents,116 
and additionally, do not receive the statutory and regulatory protections 
afforded to rent stabilized tenants. 
C. Proposed Legislation 
The media attention around the lack of oversight of the 421-a pro-
gram prompted legislation in the City Council. In late 2017, two bills were 
enacted to amend the sections of the Administrative Code relevant to ad-
ministration of the 421-a program. The first, proposed by Councilmember 
Stephen T. Levin, requires HPD to conduct an annual audit of at least 
20% of buildings receiving 421-a to ensure compliance with the afforda-
bility requirements.117 The second measure, proposed by Councilmember 
Jumaane D. Williams, would require HPD to annually audit at least 20% 
of buildings receiving 421-a to ensure compliance with 421-a’s registra-
tion requirement.118 Similar mechanisms would likely prove useful in se-
curing compliance with the City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing pro-
gram. 
III. LEARNING FROM 421-A: MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY HOUSING AS A 
FAILED TOOL FOR DEVELOPING PERMANENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
The exposé surrounding the lack of oversight of the 421-a program 
triggered a number of alarms. For elected officials, the lack of oversight 
was especially egregious because the City forwent millions of dollars in 
tax revenue to administer 421-a – tax dollars that could have been used to 
directly fund the production of affordable housing or used for subsidies 
to house shelter residents.119 While City officials shared a similar senti-
ment, tenant groups and affordable housing advocates focused on what 
developers had promised to deliver in exchange for the tax breaks totaling 
 
 116 See discussion supra Section II; N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., supra note 106, at 8. 
 117 NEW YORK, N.Y., Local Law No. 193 (2017). 
 118 NEW YORK, N.Y., Local Law No. 194 (2017). 
 119 See Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., Mayor de Blasio, DOF and 
HPD Announce Suspension Notices Sent to Owners of 3,000 Rental Buildings Out of Compli-
ance With 421-a (Dec. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/8HBJ-R3YF. 
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millions of dollars – a promise that was not kept: rent regulated apart-
ments and income-restricted apartments to help address the ever intensi-
fying affordability crisis in the City.120 
Tenant and affordable housing advocacy groups also related the lack 
of oversight to the big-picture affordable housing crisis in the City; with 
no agency affirmatively taking the reins over 421-a, what other incentive-
based affordability programs were falling by the wayside? The question 
must be asked of every affordability scheme in the City. With the deep-
ening affordability crisis, no affordable unit can be spared. 
In the context of MIH, is it productive to wait until developers have 
already failed to provide affordable units, and attempt to implement over-
sight as an after-the-fact (as is the case with 421-a)? Or rather, would the 
pre-emptive creation of an oversight program prevent malfeasance? If 
government is tasked with enforcing MIH, where no single agency takes 
responsibility, is delegating oversight to various state and city agencies a 
good choice? The answer to these questions must be informed by the 421-
a program and how it is currently administered. 
A. Housing Preservation and Development: One Agency to Oversee 
MIH Program in Its Entirety 
HPD should be tasked with enforcing the MIH program. Unlike 421-
a, a program created by the State yet administered by the City, MIH is 
both created by the City and administered by the City.121 Although 
DHCR, a state agency, has some involvement in both programs – where 
it comes to rent regulation – subjecting MIH apartments to rent regulation 
and requiring landlords to register with DHCR acts more like a tool to 
provide tenant protections rather than regulate compliance. Further, alt-
hough the DOB is delegated with the task of enforcing the zoning ordi-
nance,122 the agency’s primary concern is the City’s construction codes 
and regulations. As the program stands, HPD’s matter-of-fact involve-
ment with MIH is greater than all other agencies involved – MIH appli-
cations are submitted to and approved by HPD and HPD and developers 
enter into a regulatory agreement.123 As a result, the agency is in the great-
est position to enforce MIH’s affordability provisions. 
 
 120 See Cezary Podkul, NYC Lawmakers Push for Audits of Landlords Who Pocket $1.4 
Billion Tax Break, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016, 4:36 PM), https://perma.cc/K7EH-64UG. 
 121 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 122 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 71-00 (2018). 
 123 See discussion supra Section I.B.2. 
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1. Certificate of Occupancy: The City’s Leverage for Non-
Compliance 
Logically, HPD’s leverage for preventing non-compliance should be 
the ability to revoke the benefit given to the developers. In the context of 
421-a, for example, HPD can request that the Department of Finance re-
voke a non-complying property owner’s tax benefits and even request that 
any benefits received while in non-compliance be forfeited.124 However, 
in the context of MIH, it is impracticable, if not impossible, for HPD to 
revoke the zoning variances received by developers. 
When a developer or its administering agent fails to comply with 
MIH’s affordability requirements, HPD may have the option to request 
that the DOB revoke the non-complying building’s Certificate of Occu-
pancy. However, this remedy would require tenants, even tenants of the 
non-affordable apartments, to vacate their apartments.125 
Since it is unlikely that HPD would chose to revoke a building’s Cer-
tificate of Occupancy, and further, HPD cannot revoke the benefit re-
ceived by developers, HPD is currently left with one option: to enforce 
the regulatory agreement between the agency and the developer.126 
2. HPD: A Single System to Affirmatively Enforce 
Further, HPD can create a sub-agency that is entirely devoted to the 
enforcement of all City-administered, incentive-based affordability pro-
grams, such as MIH and 421-a. The sub-agency could develop expertise 
on each program’s nuances, and the various ways to both assess non-com-
pliance and compel compliance. While maintaining such a sub-agency 
would require recurring funding from the City, HPD already has a number 
of offices that handle applications for affordable housing programs, as 
well as offices that oversee enforcement of other laws, regulations, and 
 
 124 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (10)(b) (McKinney 2018). 
 125 The DOB may issue a vacate order to any occupied residential building without a Cer-
tificate of Occupancy. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 28-201.2.1, 28-207.4 (2018). 
 126 Currently, the DOB has the explicit authority to enforce the Zoning Resolution. See 
ZONING RESOLUTION § 71-00. While HPD may “exercise . . . all functions of the city relating 
to the rehabilitation, maintenance, alteration and improvement of residential buildings and 
privately owned housing,” HPD may not have the authority to litigate for the enforcement of 
Regulatory Agreements. NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER OF 2002 ch. 12, § 1802 (2018). To make 
HPD’s authority explicit, the City Council can amend the City Charter or the Zoning Resolu-
tion to explicitly permit HPD to enforce the agreements. Further, the Zoning Resolution grants 
HPD the ability to establish and enforce “Guidelines” – regulations found within the Rules of 
the City of N.Y. See NEW YORK, N.Y., R.C.N.Y. § 41-01-25 (N.Y. 2017); ZONING 
RESOLUTION § 23-96(k). As a result, HPD could promulgate regulations detailing the enforce-
ment of MIH. 
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codes.127 HPD would merely need to consolidate a few of these offices 
and promote the affirmative enforcement of MIH and other affordability 
programs. Lastly, the City could implement a system for tenants to submit 
administrative complaints. Tenants could then assist HPD by notifying 
the agency of any possible violations. 
B. Proposals: Legal Remedies to Enforce the Mandatory Inclusionary 
Housing Program 
Should City agencies decide that it is not within their duty to affirm-
atively enforce MIH’s affordability provisions, the burden of enforcement 
falls on third parties. These third parties include tenant and legal organi-
zations. 
If and when an owner is non-compliant, a tenant would generally be 
unaware that their apartment is income-restricted. A tenant would only 
gain this knowledge if they accessed the regulatory agreement that is rec-
orded with the building’s tax lot. Even so, the tenant must then differen-
tiate between whether rent was properly calculated at the time of initial 
occupancy and whether rent was properly calculated at lease renewal, a 
task that involves knowledge of RGB increases and requires various 
mathematical calculations (a task that is so potentially erroneous that 
HPD has entrusted only approved non-profit managers). 
First, a centralized, public resource listing all MIH properties would 
assist tenants and various legal organizations in determining whether 
MIH’s affordability provisions have been violated. A public list would 
allow tenants and legal organizations to identify buildings within the MIH 
program and determine what affordability levels, or options, the owner 
agreed to comply with in exchange for participation in the MIH program. 
City officials can also implement a number of legal mechanisms to 
assist tenants in compelling compliance with MIH. For example, the City 
Council could amend the Administrative Code to create a cause of action 
for tenants of MIH buildings. Additionally, an amendment to the Zoning 
Resolution could require all MIH Regulatory Agreements to include a 
provision explicitly granting tenants third party beneficiary status.128 As 
 
 127 See Office Descriptions, N.Y.C. HOUS. PRES. & DEV., https://perma.cc/5RH5-TV5Q. 
 128 Under current case law, a third party (i.e. a party who is not a signatory to the regulatory 
agreement), may sue to enforce a regulatory agreement only when the covenantee intended to 
“create a servitude or right which should inure to the benefit of the land . . . and should be 
annexed to it as an appurtenance.” KRISTINA E. MUSIC BIRO ET AL., 43A N.Y. JUR. 2D DEEDS 
§ 167 (2018). There must be a clear intent to establish the restriction for the third party’s ben-
efit, and this intention must be shown by the “entire context, and, where the meaning is doubt-
ful, by the consideration of such surrounding circumstances which the parties are presumed to 
have considered when their minds met.” Id. It is believed that no tenant has attempted to en-
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a result, tenants could seek an injunction to enforce the Regulatory Agree-
ments between HPD and owners. 
Moreover, should tenant advocates consider suing landlords directly 
for violations of the Zoning Resolution itself, under current case law, ten-
ants must first exhaust administrative remedies for violations of the Zon-
ing Resolution before bringing suit in civil or supreme court.129 Advocates 
may encourage tenants to file complaints with the DOB claiming viola-
tions of the Zoning Resolution.130 However, this tool has never been used, 
since the DOB typically processes complaints for violations of the Build-
ing Code. 
CONCLUSION 
In a moment where Bill de Blasio’s mayoral term is defined by an 
increasing homeless population,131 by extremely low vacancy rates in 
homeless shelters,132 and by public pushback to a shelter system expan-
sion,133 the necessity for a properly maintained affordable housing stock 
is apparent. While ensuring that affordable housing programs are properly 
administered may be a large task, the City is capable of handling the re-
sponsibility. 
The City can mitigate violations of the MIH program, first, by creat-
ing a single sub-agency within HPD to oversee all incentive-based, af-
fordable housing programs administered by the City. Additionally, the 
City could implement legal mechanisms that would allow tenants to more 
easily bring litigation against non-compliant owners. The City Council 
can create a cause of action within the Administrative Code, and Regula-
tory Agreements between HPD and developers can include a provision 
 
force a regulatory agreement under the IH program, and until MIH developments are under-
way, this legal remedy remains a speculative option. See also Mendel v. Henry Phipps Plaza 
West, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 783 (2006) (setting forth the requisites to establish third party beneficiary 
status); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Ernst & Young, 285 A.D.2d 101 (1st Dep’t 2001) (“A non-party 
may sue for breach of contract only if it is an intended, and not a mere incidental, beneficiary, 
and then only if the intent to benefit the third party is apparent from the face of the contract.”). 
 129 See Crystal Pond Homes, Inc. v. Prior, 267 A.D.2d 383 (2d Dep’t 1999); Delafield 246 
Corp. v. Dep’t of Bldgs., City of N.Y., 218 A.D.2d 613 (1st Dep’t 1995). 
 130 See Beckerman, supra note 24. 
 131 See generally Homelessness in New York City, COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (2018), 
https://perma.cc/WUN3-DA7E. 
 132 Based on the author’s conversations with attorneys at The Legal Aid Society’s Home-
less Rights Project. No public data on vacancy rates exist. However, the continual trend to use 
commercial hotels as temporary emergency shelters is a clear sign that standard shelter facil-
ities have reached capacity. See, e.g., Nicholas Rizzi, Neighbors Angry After Sunset Park Ho-
tel Becomes Homeless Center, PATCH (Dec. 21 2017, 4:14 PM), https://perma.cc/4MAW-
TF2T. 
 133 See Nikita Stewart, De Blasio Quietly Seeks Allies in Battle Over Homeless Shelters, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/8E3G-B83D. 
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explicitly granting tenants third party beneficiary status. Creating these 
legal mechanisms not only shifts the burden from the City to properly 
administer the program but would require minimal involvement from city 
officials. 
Tenants, however, should not bear the burden of oversight over MIH. 
As evidenced by the extensive lack of oversight over the 421-a program, 
incentive-based affordable housing programs – usually couched within 
complex tax laws or zoning ordinances – are not easily enforced by ten-
ants. Perhaps across-the-board rent restrictions, applicable to all pri-
vately-owned units, would prove less complicated for city officials and 
tenants alike. 
 
